Department of State

Brasilia: INFO : Amembassy Rio de Janeiro

AMB
POL-2
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Monthly Trends Report - April 1971

Belem
Bele
P Alegre
S Paulo-3
Recife-3
Salvador
ARA/Dean
ARA/LA/BR
INR/CS/BR
INR/RAR/LA

Rio:
DCM
MINECON
ECON
USIS
POL-2
POL/R
SCI
DAO-3
MILGP-2
CGR-2

1. Brazil Shows Desire to Cooperate on Territorial Seas

During the month, the Foreign Minister and lesser ranking Itamaraty and Naval officials took pains to make clear Brazil's hope that arrangements could be reached so that incidents arising from Brazil's claimed 200-mile limit would be avoided. Although the new fishing regulations applicable to the 200-mile limit were published on April 2, Brazilian officials informed the Embassy that enforcement would only start June 1. The GOB saw that all naval commands were aware of this decision and acted to calm down the Governor of the Territory of Amapa who wished to take precipitous action. In private conversation between the Ambassador and the Foreign Minister and in other conversations at lower levels, the Brazilians expressed hope that the U.S. would work out a bilateral fishing arrangement with Brazil; that they could accommodate the U.S.'s need to reserve its legal position, pending the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference; that the inshore 100-mile zone (restricted by decree to Brazilians) could be opened for Americans, as could the ban on foreigners fishing for shrimps. Concerning the non-fishing implications of the 200-mile limit, Brazilian officials repeated their desire not to interfere with U.S. defense responsibilities in the area.

Enclosure:
1. Chronology of Political Events March-April 1971
2. **Terrorism May Be Entering a New Phase**

On April 15, Henning Boilesen, a prominent businessman, was gunned down as he was driving to work on a crowded Sao Paulo street by six terrorists. A fly sheet left at the scene of the crime indicated that the victim had been "executed" as a "CIA agent"* and for his close collaboration with official Brazilian anti-terrorist intelligence operations. It warned that he was but the first in a series of individuals linked to the Government and "US imperialism" marked for assassination. The killers identified themselves as members of the Tiradentes Revolutionary Movement (MRT) and the National Liberation Action (ALN) and stated that their act was also in retaliation for the killing of the MRT leader earlier in the month. Two days later, Brazilian security forces apprehended a member of the MRT linked to the assassination; information found in his home led to the hideout of the leader of the MRT who had directly participated in the murder. The latter was killed resisting arrest while the former died under vigorous interrogation.

There are strong indications from a number of sources that security forces are now more inclined to eliminate important terrorists than hold them after interrogation.

The assassination of Boilesen may turn out to be an isolated incident as the terrorists reassess the advisability of this type of operation considering their losses. However, in light of the flysheet left at the scene of the crime, together with similar information from various sources, there is reason to believe that urban terrorists have decided to substitute assassination of businessmen and government officials for the kidnapping of foreign diplomats as their major tactic. If the above information is accurate, there may be a marked escalation of violence on the part of both the terrorists and Brazilian security forces.

3. **Federal Interference in State Politics**

A political squabble in the State of Parana, which brought about President Medici's direct intervention, is proof once again of his intent to control State politics. The new Governor, Haroldo Leon Peres, charged his predecessor,

*COMMENT: He was not.
Paulo Pimentel, before the State Assembly, with leaving the State Treasury heavily in debt and implied serious financial irregularities committed during his term of administration. When Pimentel retaliated through news media he controlled, Peres had police confiscate scripts and TV tapes for possible prosecution for libel. The President summoned the new Governor to Brasilia and sharply reprimanded him for his actions. Medici instructed Peres to forward his accusations to the Ministry of Justice and ordered him to cease squabbling with Pimentel.

The President's dictum served to warn other states having similar differences, such as Bahia and Goias, that the President is willing to intervene in any internal State political battles to insure an appearance of political tranquility. His willingness to intervene, however, does not change the fact that many states are broke and that there exist numerous problems beneath the surface.

4. Congress Session Starts

The Congress began its 1971 session on March 31 and by the end of April certain patterns had become evident. Rejecting counsels of caution by party Secretary General Dep. Adolfo Oliveira, the MDB adopted a line of aggressive and blunt criticism of the government advocated by its Chamber leader Pedroso Horta. Words like dictatorship and corruption were not eschewed as the government was called to account for police abuses, political repression, use of arbitrary powers, the Niteroi-Rio Bridge, influencing the last election in favor of ARENA, etc. There were certain subjects, however, that the MDB recognized as too sensitive to bring up; for example, the President, the military, and naming individuals involved in torture.

In its replies to these criticisms, ARENA showed some signs of disorganization. Its usual response was to ignore the specifics of MDB charges by alleging that criticism of the government would bring back the bad old pre-1964 days, aid terrorism, and derail economic progress. Although these debates received normal inside page coverage in the national newspapers, the press often avoided direct quotation of the more spicy MDB attacks and the Congressional Record has become the most lively political reading in the country. In any case, there was no indication that the
country was listening. Protected by a huge and tame ARENA majority and reassured that the MDB was not penetrating the veil of political apathy covering the country or tarnishing the favorable image of President Medici, the government let it be known that it would not retaliate against the MDB's attacks.

5. Brazilian Unions Show Nationalist Feelings

Following through on a resolution approved at the IV Conference of the National Confederation of Industrial Workers (CNTI) last September, the CNTI Council of Representatives voted unanimously on March 31 to disaffiliate from ORIT and the ICFTU. The decision to disaffiliate was closely linked to nationalistic arguments and the desire to publicly repudiate what some union and GOB officials consider a protectionist attitude by the AFL-CIO, especially against the importation of Brazilian shoes and textiles. The disaffiliation action was probably stimulated in part by government officials as another means of condemning protectionism and also as a warning that Brazil will not tolerate criticism of its internal affairs by American labor or other groups.

In a related move, President Medici signed a decree April 5 which in effect restated and reaffirmed previous regulations (1968) governing international affiliations. The decree provides that Brazilian union groups can only affiliate with or enter into agreements with international groups with prior Presidential authorization. Foreign or international labor organizations must also have Presidential authorization in order to open offices in Brazil. The decree also specifically forbids loans or grants by such foreign or international labor groups (which may include AIFLD) to Brazilian unions without prior approval by the Labor Ministry. Although the decree does not deny to Brazilian unions the right of international association, it certainly reveals continuing GOB conservatism in its attitude toward international labor activity and a desire to be well informed about and be able to exercise control over such activity.

ROUNTREE
Chronology of the Most Significant Political Events During the Months of March - April 1971

March 31 - President Medici speaks to the nation on the occasion of the Seventh Anniversary of the Revolution.

March 31 - The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, Gregorio Lopez Bravo, arrives in Brazil for a three-day official visit.

March 31 - A Catholic priest, Father Giulio Vicini is convicted to four months in prison by the Second Military Court of Sao Paulo. He is found guilty of distributing subversive pamphlets together with social welfare worker, Iara Espadini. Miss Espadini is acquitted.

April 2 - Decree regulating fishing in Brazil's claimed 200-mile territorial sea published in Diario Official.

April 5 - President Medici signs a decree establishing the requirements for Brazilian labor unions seeking to affiliate with international or foreign organizations.

April 15 - A Sao Paulo businessman, Henning Boilesen, is killed by terrorists in Sao Paulo.

April 16 - The President signs a decree designating former First Army Commander General Siseno Sarmiento as a Minister on the Supreme Military Court (STN).

April 16 - President Medici designates Antonio Neder a Minister of the Federal Supreme Court, replacing Adauto Cardoso who had resigned.

April 22 - The Minister of Foreign Affairs of West Germany, Walter Scheel, arrives in Brazil for a two-day official visit primarily to dedicate Germany's new chancellery.

April 24 - A "National Seminar for Integration and Debate" is held by the opposition party, MDB, in Porto Alegre.

April 24 - Dom Eugenio Sales takes office as Cardinal-Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro.